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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
THE ADOPTION OF:

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

INFANT ANONYMOUS•

Case No. 87-0415CA

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section
78-2a-3(2) (g) (1987) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County rendered by the Honorable
Richard H. Moffat in which Judge Moffat ruled that the consent to
the adoption of the infant anonymous was not given freely and
unconditionally by the natural mother and consequently allowed
he revocation of consent for adoption and dismissed Appellants'
petition for adoption.

-1-

ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL
1.

Does the setting aside of a consent for adoption by one

judge constitute a reversal of the judge or commissioner (as
allowed by Section 78-30-8 Utah Code Annotated) who took the
original consent.
2.

When the issue of which judge is to preside is raised

and neither party expresses any objection to Judge Moffat and
both parties participate in arguing the motion and no objection
is made until after a judgment is rendered, have the parties
waived their right to object.
3.

Is it

appropriate

for the Trial

Court to grant a

revocation of consent for adoption when it is apparant from the
facts that the consent was not given freely, voluntarily and
unconditionally and when the mother was acting under a mistaken
belief as to the finality of the consent.
4.

Is it necessary to have an evidentiary hearing on a

motion to set aside a consent for adoption or is an evidentiary
hearing something which can be wavied.
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. 78-30-8 (1987):
Procedure - Agreement of adopting parents. The person
adopting a child and the child adopted, and the other
persons whose consent is necessary, must appear before
the district court of the county where the person
adopting resides, and the necessary consent must
thereupon be signed and an agreement be executed by
the person adopting to the effect that the child shall
-2-

be adopted and treated in all respects as his own
lawful child; provided, that if a person whose consent
is necessary is not within the county the court may,
in the same manner as is or may be provided for the
taking of depositions in civil cases, appoint a
commissioner to examine such person upon his
deposition and to take his written consent and to
certify the same to the court. The commissioner shall
explain to such person the legal significance of such
consent, and shall certify to the court his findings
as to whether or not the consent is freely given.
Where such person is within the state of Utah the
commission shall issue to a judge of the district
court of the county in which such person is located.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The natural mother at the time she gave birth to the infant
anonymous, was 21 years of age.

This was her first pregnancy

and at the time she was living at home and working off and on.
(Addendum "AM at page 2)

Throughout the pregnancy, the natural

mother was able to conceal the fact that she was pregnant and in
fact the pregnancy was a mystery even to Respondent's mother.
(Addendum "A" at page 2.)
Prior to the birth of the child, the natural mother spoke to
some persons but the only real contact with any adoption agency
was approximately June 1, 1987.

(Addendum "A" at page 2. )

June 23, 1987, the infant anonymous was born.
"B" at page 2.)

On

(R. 116 Addendum

At that time, since persons in the natural

mother's household were not aware of the pregnancy nor the birth
of the child, the natural mother had a chance to place the child
for adoption and avoid any embarrassment or conflict with her
immediate family and, in fact, inquired into the possibility of
-3-

adoption.

(Addendum "A" at page 3.)

Between June 5 and the time the consent was taken, on only
one

occasion

did

the

natural

mother

involved meet to discuss the adoption.
The

child

was

born

approximately 4:19 a.m.

on

June

and

the

other

persons

(Addendum "A" at Page 3.)

23,

1987, a Tuesday,

(R. 116 Addendum "BIf at page 2.)

at
On

Wednesday, June 24, 1987, the natural mothei: was before the Court
at which time the issues of consent were addressed.

After an

extensive period of labor and the birth of Respondent's child,
the

Respondent,

adoption.

within

30

hours

executed

the

(R. 43 Addendum "C" at paragraph 15. )

consent

for

At the time

Respondent signed the consent, she was on pain medication and
prior to the time she went to Court, she had significant doubts
about giving the child up for adoption.
Affidavit of Respondent.)
consent,

Respondent

(See paragraph 3 of

Subsequent to the signing of the

acknowledged

that

she

felt

the

pain

medication together with the stress of child birth had left her
without sufficient will and strength to properly evaluate the
matter.

(R. 22; Addendum "D" paragraph 3.)

As soon as Respondent left the hospital and regained her
strength and was able to rationally consider the matter, she
realized that she did not want to lose her child and wanted to
raise the child.

(R. 22; Addendum "D" paragraph 4.)

In addition to the medication and stress, Respondent was
-4-

informed and believed that the Decree of Adoption did not become
final for six months after signing the consent and that she had
the six month period of time in which she could change her mind.
She did not realize nor understand that the giving of her consent
and the signing of the affidavit would conclude the matter but
rather was under the belief that she had six months before the
adoption became final and that any time prior to the finality of
the adoption she could change her mind.

(R. 22; Addendum D

paragraph 6.)
Based upon Respondent? s resolve to take whatever measures
were necessary to regain her child, Respondent, within two days
informed her councilor, Susan Bagley, that she wanted the child
and in fact retained an attorney and as soon as sufficient monies
could

be

raised

moved

to

set

Conclusions of Law, and Consent.

aside

the

Findings

of Fact,

The Motion and Memorandum were

timely and promptly filed with the Court on the 22nd day of July
1987.

(R. 11; Addendum "E".)
In short, the baby was born early in the morning on Tuesday,

June 23, 1987.

On June 24, 1987, which was a Wednesday, the

natural mother was before the Court on the issues of adoption.
On Saturday, June 27, 1987, the natural mother called
Bagley, the counselor who was assisting

Susan

in the adoption and

informed her at that time that she wanted the child back and
would not consent to the adoption.

-5-

(Addendum "A" at page 3.)

After the natural mother had given birth and had appeared
before the Court, she finally spoke to her family with regard to
her circumstances and after she had seen the reaction of her
family in that they were supportive and willing to stand by her
at that time, the natural mother realized the circumstances and
promptly notified Susan Bagley of her intentions.

(Addendum "A"

at page 5. )
The Respondent's Motion came on for hearing on August 31,
1987, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat-

At the time of

the hearing, Judge Moffat was particularly concerned with two
aspects of the case.

First, Judge Moffat addressed the issue of

whether Judge Murphy, the judge who originally took the consent,
should be the judge who presided over the proceedings.

At the

time of the hearing, both parties argued their position and when
confronted with the question of who should hear the matter,
neither party objected to Judge Moffat hearing the arguments in
lieu of the circumstances and, consequently, waived

their rights

at that time to have the matter heard by Judge Murphy.
88; Addendum "F".)

(R. 87-

The Minute Entry attached as Addendum "F"

specifically states that the parties had waived their rights to
have Judge Murphy hear the matter based upon the waiver and
agreement of the parties and, consequently, Judge Moffat rendered
his decision.

(R. 87-88; Addendum "F" .)

The second matter of concern to Judge Moffat was whether an
-6-

evidentiary

hearing

was necessary.

Again,

counsel

for both

parties argued their substantive positions at the August 31,
1987,

hearing

and made no objection to having

the evidence

presented by proffer of counsel and, consequently, waived their
right to have a full blown evidentiary hearing.

The Court,

having considered the matter, also stated in the Minute Entry
attached

as Addendum

"F" that

the

parties

having

made

no

objection, had waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing.
(R. 87-88; Addendum "F".)
Based upon the proffered evidence by way of oral argument
and affidavit, Judge Moffat found that Respondent did not freely
and voluntarily give an unconditional release of her parental
rights

and,

therefore, ordered

forthwith to her natural mother.

that

the

child

(R.57; Addendum

be

returned

ff ff

G .)

Pursuant to the Minute Entry, attached as Addendum "G", the
Court recognized that whatever decision it made was going to be
emotionally

disturbing

Addendum "G".)

to one or the other

party.

(R.57;

However, the Court was convinced from the reading

of the transcript of the proceedings, that the consent was not
unconditional and in fact implied that her consent was not final
and that the proceedings would have to "go forward."
Addendum "G".)

(R. 57;

As an additional basis for the Court's ruling,

the Court determined that the natural mother was not clearly
apprised of the finality of signing the consent and specifically,
-7-

the Court found that the natural mother was confused and indeed
believed that even though she signed the consent she would still
have six months during which time the Decree of Adoption would
not become final and that any time during that six month period
she could withdraw her consent.

(Addendum "H".)

The Court was further impressed that the natural mother had
not consulted members of her family until after the birth of the
child and in fact advised the counselor that she wanted the child
back within days of the signing of the consent.

(R. 57; Addendum

V . )
On

September

4,

1987, counsel

for Petitioners

filed a

Protective Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative Amendment
from Judgment or Relief from Judgment on th€* basis that the Court
had allegedly errored in setting aside the consent given in front
of and accepted by another District Judge and failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing.

(R. 66-68.)

Petitioners' Motion was heard by Judge Moffat on September
23, 1987.
ruled

that

For a second time, Judge Moffat heard argument and
the

consent was not voluntarily

given, that the

parties had waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing, and
the parties had waived their right to have Judge Murphy hear the
matter.

(R. 87-88; Addendum "F".)

Petitioners requested Judge Moffat to stay his Order pending
appeal.

(R. 64.)

Judge Moffat denied Petitioners' Motion and on
-8-

September 5, 1987, Petitioners, without involving counsel for the
Respondent, obtained from this Court an Ex Parte Order staying
Execution of the District Court decision. (Addendum "I".)
At no time prior to the signing of the Stay of Execution nor
subsequent thereto has a hearing been held on the Order Staying
Execution.
On February 5, 1988, pursuant to a Motion by the Petitioners
to vacate Ruling, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law, and
Order and Judgment, a hearing was held again before Judge Moffat
and for a third time the issues were presented to Judge Moffat
and although minor changes were made to the wording of the Order,
(Addendum "H") Judge Moffat upheld his prior rulings and again
held

that

the prior proceedings were

appropriate, that the

consent be set aside and that the adoptive parents forthwith
return the minor child to the natural mother.

(Addendum "H".)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
A party's failure to object to Judge Moffat hearing the
matter prior to the rendering of his decision constitutes a
waiver of the right to later object to his ruling.

The first

hearing set on August 31, 1987, pursuant to Respondent's Motion
to Set Aside the Consent, Judge Moffat specifically addressed the
issue of whether he should hear the case and counsel for both
Appellants

and Respondent made no objection to Judge Moffat
-9-

hearing the matter and in fact both parties argued the matter at
that time. Consequently, the Appellants have waived their right
to have the matter retried before Judge Murphy solely because
they are not pleased with the outcome.
POINT II
Also, at the initial hearing on August 31, 1987, neither
party raised the issue nor requested an evidentiary hearing. Both
the Respondent and Appellants made no objection to arguing the
motion as opposed to calling in witnesses and,- proffered the
testimony which would otherwise be given.

At that point, the

parties waived their right to an evidentiary hearing.
Once the affidavits and oral argument were presented to
Judge Moffat then Judge Moffat had the responsibility of making a
decision based upon the arguments and affidavits as well as to
assess the credibility of the affidavits and evidence and to make
a decision based thereon.
POINT III
In order for the ruling of Judge Moffat to constitute a
reversal,

it

would

be

necessary

for

Judge

Murphy

to

have

previously ruled in an adversarial proceeding as to whether the
original consent should or should not have been set aside.

The

fact of the matter is that Judge Murphy never addressed the issue
of whether it was appropriate to set aside the consent nor did
Judge Murphy ever make a ruling as to whether the circumstances
-10-

warranted

a setting

aside of

the natural

mother's consent.

Judge Moffat's Ruling setting aside the consent was a matter
which was heard for the first time by Judge Moffat who is the
only judge who has ruled on the matter and in no way constitutes
a reversal of any decision made by Judge Murphy or any other
judge.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PARTIES ARE BOUND WHEN COUNSEL WAIVES CERTAIN RIGHTS
AND CONSEQUENTLY, APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO OBJECT TO
JUDGE MOFFAT HEARING THE MATTER PRECLUDES APPELLANTS
FROM NOW ASSERTING THAT JUDGE MOFFAT INAPPROPRIATELY
RULED ON THE MATTER
Throughout

Appellants'

argument

to

Point

I,

they

appropriately set out that a party who is not satisfied with a
ruling of a Judge should be precluded from presenting the issue
to a co-equal judge or, to forum shop until a favorable forum is
found.

In addition, Appellants correctly assert that one co-

equal court can not over-rule another co-equal court.

Respondent

makes no argument and, in fact, agrees that those are correct
principles of law.

However, frankly, those principles of law do

not support Appellants' position.
For some reason, Appellants have resolved that the natural
mother in bringing her Petition before Judge Moffat was forum
shopping or looking

for some advantage in having the matter

heard before Judge Moffat as opposed to Judge Murphy.
-11-

In fact,

Appellants assert:
At minimum, Respondent should be asked to face the
judge to whom she initially testified and convince
that judge that he errored when he accepted her
initial testimony as true and released the child to
the Petitioners.
(See page 17 and 18, Appellants'
Brief.)
The allegations that the natural mother preferred one judge
as opposed to another is ill founded and completely ignores the
critical periods of time relative to which judge should hear the
matter.

At the time the natural mother filed her motion in the

Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, there
was no reason for the natural mother to believe that the case
would be assigned to Judge Moffat as opposed to any other Third
District Judge.

In fact, at that time, the natural inclination

would be that the matter would be assigned to Judge Murphy as
opposed to some other judge.

The assignment of the matter to one

judge as opposed to another was a decision, which was made wholly
by third parties for which the natural mother had no control or
input.

The allegations by Appellants that Judge Murphy should

have heard the matter as opposed to Judge Moffat was a decision
which

was

made

proceedings.

by

persons

completely

unattached

to

When Appellants assert in their brief that:

It is not uncommon that the parties on both sides of
an issue are not wholly satisfied with the ruling of a
judge. Are they then allowed to present the issue to
another co-equal judge so long as neither party
expressed a desire to have the first judge hear the
issue again? If so, the policy behind the rule would
be effectively undermined.
(See Appellants1 Brief
-12-

these

page 18.)
It is difficult to understand how the argument cited supra
by Appellants can support their position.

Certainly at the time

the natural mother filed her motion in the Third District, the
natural assumption would be that Judge Murphy would be the judge
assigned to hear the motion.
At the time the matter was set for hearing, a notice was
given that the motion would be heard before Judge Moffat as
opposed to Judge Murphy.

Appellants made no objection at that

time as to the forum or the judge who would preside.

At the time

both

to

parties

actually

came

before

Judge

Moffat

present

argument on the motion, Appellants made no objection to Judge
Moffat presiding.

In fact, as can be seen in the transcript

attached as Exhibit "A" , there was no indication any where in
the proceedings that Appellants had any feelings one way or the
other which judge heard the matter.

At the time oral argument

was heard before Judge Moffat, the natural mother had no reason
to believe that Judge Moffat's Court would be any more or less
favorable to her position than Judge Murphy's Court.

In short,

at the time oral argument was heard on the natural mother's
petition, the natural mother had no preference as to the forum
and it appears that counsel for Appellants had no preference as
to the forum because no objection was made.

At no time prior to

the time Judge Moffat rendered his decision did the natural
-13-

mother have a preference of forum and had Appellants objected to
Judge

Moffat

presiding,

the

natural

mother

would

not

have

resisted the motion being reassigned to Judge Murphy.
It is only after a decision has been rendered adjudicating
the rights of the respective parties that the natural mother has
an objection to a change in forum.

The fact of the matter that

Appellants have remained silent until after a decision has been
rendered and only then complains as to the forum, is prejudicial
and unfair to the natural mother.
When

Appellants

considerations

speak

in

the

need

and

their

brief

for

of

sound

efficient

policy

consistent

administration of a case, it would be entirely improper to allow
Appellants to set back and wait for a decision to be rendered on
the merits and only after realizing an adverse decision to be
able to claim that Judge Moffat should not have heard the matter.
Appellants' argument in Point I of their brief also sets out
at

length

Murphy's

that
finding

the

natural

that

her

mother
consent

directly
had

been

attacked
knowingly

Judge
and

voluntarily given and that her affidavit supporting her motion to
set aside the consent contradicted the testimony which she gave
Judge Murphy at the time the consent was originally taken.
page 16 and 17 of Appellants' Brief.)

(See

Certainly, Respondent

would not agree with the characterization set out by Appellants
but the point is that Judge Moffat had a complete copy of the

-14-

transcript setting out verbatim the questions which were asked
and answered at the time the original consent was offered to
Judge Murphy,

In essence, Judge Moffat read every word that was

spoken in the proceedings in which the consent was obtained and,
therefore, was fully aware of what went on before Judge Murphy
and was

fully apprised of those

decision.

facts when he rendered his

There is no reason to believe that Judge Murphy would

have ruled any differently than Judge Moffat had ruled had the
matter been decided before him.

Consequently, after a decision

has been rendered by Judge Moffat, being fully apprised of the
facts, to have the matter reheard before Judge Murphy would only
mean that Appellants would have a second shot of obtaining a
favorable
authorities

decision,
for

the

as being

very

thing

they

inappropriate.

claim

and

cite

Consequently, when

Appellants state:
Justice is not served by allowing Respondent to
rescind the testimony given before one judge by
submitting contradictory testimony to another judge.
(See page 17 of Appellants1 Brief.)
Appellants ignore the fact that Judge Moffat had the benefit of
the transcript

from the original consent proceedings and was

fully aware of what went on at the time the consent was given.
There is no question that the issue of whether Judge Moffat
should decide the matter was raised

and contemplated

by the

parties and the Court and that counsel for both parties agreed to
allow Judge Moffat to preside over the matter.
-15-

Judge Moffat's

Minute Entry attached as Addendum "F" states:
The reason for said denial is that while the matter
should perhaps have initially been heard by the judge
that took the consent, this Court discussed that
matter with counsel for the parties at the time of the
initial hearing herein and neither party expressed a
desire to have the judge who took the consent hear
the matter. In addition, the matter was submitted on
affidavits and oral argument, without any request for
entry of additional evidence.
It is the Court's
opinion that had the parties asked either to have the
original judge hear the matter or have an evidentiary
hearing, both of said motions would have been granted.
However, having not done so, this Court is of the
opinion that those matters have been waived.
A majority of the adjacent jurisdictions have also held that
when a party participates in proceedings which are substantive
and makes no objection to a particular judge presiding that a
party's right to object to the judge presiding is waived.

The

Supreme Court of Alaska has stated as follows:
We conclude that Sebring waived his right to a
peremptory challenge once Judge Carlson presided over
the first trial. Civil Rule 42(c)(4)(i) provides that
a party waives the right to challenge a particular
judge when s/he knowingly participates in any judicial
proceeding which concerns the merits of the action and
involves the consideration of evidence or of
affidavits . . .
Sebring vs. Colver

649 P.2d 932, 935 (Alaska 1982).

See also

State Ex Rel Welfare Division vs. Eighth Judicial District Court
462 P.2d 37 (Nevada 1969).
The Washington Court of Appeals has held:
One who claims a judge trying claimant's case is
biased may waive his right to complain thereof by not
timely raising the objection and proceeding with trial
-16-

or continuing with the pending trial as if the judge
were not disqualified. This rule is applicable when
disqualification of the judge is sought under RCW
4.12.040 and 2.28.030.
(Citations omitted.) We see
no reason for not applying a like rule when the
disqualification claim is based on due process
grounds. Even a due process right may be waived. See
In Re Borchert 57 Wash. 2d 719, 359 P.2d 789 (1961).
Were the rule otherwise a litigant, notwithstanding
his knowledge of the disqualifying factor, could
speculate on the successful outcome of the case and
then, having put the Court, counsel and the parties to
the trouble and expense of the trial, treat any
judgment entered as subject to successful attack.
(Emphasis added.)
Brauhn vs. Brauhn

518 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wash. 1974.)

Apppellants cite several cases for the proposition that coequal judges cannot over-rule or reverse another co-equal judge.
The
Coastline

Federal
R.

Court

of

Appeals

Co. vs. St. Joe Paper

of

Florida

Co. 216

in

Atlantic

F.2d

832, 833

(C.A.Fla.) defined a reversal as follows:
To reverse a judgment means to overthrow it by
contrary decision, make it void, undue or annul it
forever.
The critical question, therefore, is whether the taking of a
consent constitutes a judgment for which a motion to set aside
the consent would act as a reversal.
Frankly speaking, the issue as to whether or not the consent
should be set aside in the above-entitled case has only been
addressed by one judge, Judge Moffat.

The issue of whether it

was appropriate to set aside the consent was never addressed or
brought before Judge Murphy and, therefore, there can be no
-17-

reversal of a judgment by Judge Moffat because there was no
judgment ever entered to be reversed.
Respondent's do not refute the law cited by Appellants which
states that one District Court Judge cannot reverse the ruling of
a co-equal District Court Judge.

Nor does the Respondent refute

the proposition that litigants should not be allowed to forum
shop and to bring their grievances between co-equal judges in an
effort to obtain a favorable ruling.

However, the proposition

with regard to one District Court Judge over-ruling another is
not the case nor the question presented by these proceedings.
As stated in the definition of reversal as cited in Atlantic
Coastline

Supra,

there must

first have been

a judgment

to

reverse.

Certainly all parties would agree that at the time

Respondent brought her Motion to set aside the consent the only
appropriate forum was to bring the matter in District Court.

It

would have been inappropriate at that time for Respondent to
have brought the Motion in the Court of Appeals which would, in
essence, have be required if one was to take Petitioners' claim
to

its

logical

conclusion.

In other

words, in order

for

Appellants to support the allegation that Judge Moffat's decision
was reversing a co-equal judge would mean that Judge Murphy would
have had to have previously considered the Motion and had ruled
on the matter and, therefore, the appropriate forum would be for
Respondents to go directly to the Court of Appeals.
-18-

Certainly

those are not the facts nor law and, consequently, no reversal
was made between two District Court Judges.
By analogy, when one
motion,

it is well

looks at any other

accepted

and established

form of
that

60(b)

it is not

necessary for the same judge who hears the 60(b) motion also be
the judge who actually rendered the judgment.

Further no one

would argue that in the event an alternative judge set aside the
judgment pursuant to 60(b) that that decision was a reversal of
the decision entered by the judge who rendered

the judgment

sought to be set aside.
In Appellants' brief, they contend that if a different judge
hears the motion to set aside the consent as opposed to the judge
who took the consent that the ruling by the judge on the motion
to set aside would constitute a reversal of a co-equal judge.
Appellants, however, cite no case law that those circumstances
would constitute a reversal.

Although Respondent has been unable

to find case law in which a court of review has addressed the
particular issue, there are several cases in which a different
judge has heard the motion to set aside the consent as opposed to
the original judge hearing the motion.
On March 13, 1969, Respondent filed a petition and
motion with the Court to have the consent to adoption
set aside and vacated and the care, custody and
control of the infant restored to her. She claimed,
at the time she signed the consent, that she was not
aware of the nature and consequences of the act and
was acting under undue influence, coercion and
mistake.
-19-

The motion was heard by another judge who found
Respondent knew and understood what was taking place
when she signed the consent
In Re Adoption of K 465 P.2d 541 (Utah 1970).
When one reads the statute pertinent to the obtaining of a
consent for adoption, it is apparent that it is not necessary for
a judge to even make a ruling as to the validity of the consent.
. Provided, that if a person whose consent is
necessary is not within the county, the Court may, in
the same manner as is or may be provided for the
taking of depositions in civil cases, appoint a
commissioner to examine such person upon his
deposition and to take his written consent and to
certify the same to the Court. The Commissioner shall
explain to such person the legal significance of such
consent, and shall certify to the Court his findings
as to whether or not the consent is freely given.
Where such person is within the State of Utah, the
commissioner shall issue to the judge of the District
Court of the county in which such person is located.
(Emphasis added.)
As set out in statute, the Court may appoint a commissioner
who

obtains the consent and to explain the consequences of

signing

said

commissioner

consent

and

then

as

per

the

statute,

the

is the one who certifies to the Court that the

consent was freely given.

If one were to follow the position of

Appellants under those circumstances who would hear the motion to
set aside the commissioner or a district judge.

See also In the

Matter of the Adoption of F, 488 P.2d 130 (Utah 1971).

-20-

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY ALLOWED RESPONDENT TO REVOKE
HER CONESENT TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD ON THE BASIS
THAT SHE HAD BEEN INFORMED AND BELIEVED THAT SHE HAD
SIX MONTHS TO CHANGE HER MIND AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
WAS NOT REQUIRED FOR RESPONDENT TO ARGUE HER MOTION
TO SET ASIDE
A. The District Court appropriately set aside the consent
on the basis that the consent was not knowingly and
unconditionally given.
Appellants contend that once a consent is obtained that the
Trial Court conunits reversible error if after the child has been
placed with adoptive parents the Court allows a party to revoke
the consent without finding that the consent was obtained through
fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation.
Appellants' Brief.)

(See page 21 of

As authority for Appellants1 position, they

cite In re Adoption of K. 465 P.2d 541, 542 (Utah 1970).

This

characterization of the law is incorrect and inconsistent with
the more compelling weight of the case law.
The Supreme Court In the matter of S. 572 P. 2d 1371, 1374
Utah 1977) which was decided subsequent to In re Adoption K. and
which is cited by Appellants specifically states that a consent
can be set aside if it is shown that the consent was "induced
through duress, undue influence, or under some misrepresentation
or deception; or other grounds which would justify release from
the obligations of any contract."

(Emphasis added Id.)

The Utah Supreme Court has also held in P.P. vs. Social
Services and Child W. Dept. 431 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah 1967):
-21-

• The important phrase of the case is that it
recognized the right of a natural mother to revoke
written consent, and, as pointed out, when the
question of undue influence is an issue f the Court
should carefully scrutinize the evidence lest an
honest, worthy and well-meaning natural parent be
unjustly deprived of her child.1 Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held:
The mother of a illegitimate child has the right both
to its custody and to relinquish that right if for any
reason she so desires. If she so decides and freely
and voluntarily signs a release and consent for
adoption, it is binding the same as any other
contract. It is, of course, true that if no rights or
interests of third parties have intervened, the Courts
are quite liberal in permitting the withdrawal of such
consent.
In Re Adoption of F.

488 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1971).

Adjacent jurisdictions are also persuasive in setting out
the appropriate

standard with regard to the revocation of a

consent for adoption.

The Washington Court of Appeals has held:

The ultimate question is whether the result was
produced by means that seriously impaired the free and
competent exercise of judgment. Such factors as the
u n f a i r n e s s of the r e s u l t i n g b a r g a i n ,
the
unavailability of independent advice, and the
susceptibility of the person persuaded are
.circumstances to be taken into account in determining
whether there was unfair persuasion.
In the Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d 641, 181 (Wash.
App. 1982).
As

set

out

by

the Washington

Court

of

Appeals

it

is

appropriate to set aside a consent based on factors such as the
inavailability

of

independent

advice, susceptibility

of

the

person persuaded and the unfairness of the resulting bargain, all

-22-

of which are factors which do not rise to the level of fraud or
misrepresentation.
for

setting

When Appellants contend that the only basis

aside

the

consent

is fraud, undue

influence or

misrepresentation, they mischaracterize the applicable case law.
When one applies the standard as set out above to the facts
of this case, it is apparent that Judge Moffat's ruling setting
aside the consent was appropriate.

At the time the consent was

obtained, less than 30 hours had transpired since the natural
mother

had

given

birth

to her

child.

As

set out

in the

transcript attached as Addendum "A", in which counsel for the
natural mother proffered testimony as follows:
That this is the basis of her understanding. She was
told by the councilor that the adoption could not
become final for six months; and although she had
given her consent, which she understood was binding at
that time, she also understood and thought that she
had a right, during that six months to contest the
c o n s e n t ; and, therefore, the ambiguity or
misunderstanding is created as to the relationship
between the six month waiting period that is required
for adoptions in the State of Utah and her right to
revoke that consent during the same six month period
of time.
She was under the assumption that she had the right
that when she called up on Saturday, two days after
she signed the consent, that she wanted the child back
and that it was appropriate to do so.
(Addendum "A".)
Judge Moffat was also impressed as set out in the Minute
Entry attached as Addendum "G" that the natural mother had not
been counseled by any one other than Susan Bagley prior to the
-23-

time she offered the consent.
In addition, the record established at the time the consent
was given which is contained on paragraph 3 lines 11, 12, and 13,
of Addendum of "B", the Court said:
Do you understand — for want of a better word -- the
finality of this? That if it goes forward, that you
relinquish all parental rights forever.
(See
Addendum "B".)
The language "that if it goes forward" connotes that in fact the
consent was not final at that time and that there would be a
period of time before the consent would become final.
Based upon those factors, Judge Moffat appropriately ruled
that the natural mother did not voluntarily offer her consent.
B.
The evidence presented to Judge Moffat did not render
the motion the functional equivalent of a motion for summary
j udgment.
The

Petitioners

in subsection

(b) of

Point

II of

their

Argument states to the Court that Respondentf s motion to set
aside the consent based upon affidavits rendered the preceding
the functional equivalent of a motion for summary judgment.
The mere fact that there were conflicting affidavits does not
render

the

judgment.

motion

the

equivalent

of

a motion

for

summary

The motion before the Court was a motion to set aside

the consent of the natural mother.

The standard in which a

Court applies to a motion for summary judgment and the standard
in which a Court applies to a motion to set aside are entirely
different

standards.

The standard pertinent to a motion for
-24-

summary judgment is a determination of whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,

A motion to set aside

the consent seeks a determination by the Court as to whether the
consent was given voluntarily and with knowledge of its finality.
When the Court rules on a motion for summary judgment, the Court
gives deference to the affidavits of the non-moving party and, in
short, the Court is required to assume the facts set out in the
non-moving party's affidavit as being true.

In Hoibrook Company

vs. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of
the parties, or witnesses, or the weight of the
evidence, neither is it to deny parties the right to a
trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose
is to eliminate the time, trouble, and expense of
trial when upon any view taken of the facts as
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be
entitled to prevail. Only when it so appears, is the
Court justified in refusing such a party the
opportunity of presenting his evidence and attempting
to persuade the trier of fact to his view. Id.
Conversely, when evidence was offered to Judge Moffat, he
was ruling on the credibility of the affidavits and the oral
argument and there was no assumption that the non-moving party's
affidavits were true.
When Appellants cite in their brief:
It has long been established that a judge cannot
summarily determine questions of fact on the basis of
-25-

conflicting affidavits.
Appellants

misconstrue

Judge Moffat.

the nature

of

the proceedings

before

It was not the contemplation of the natural mother

or the judge that all that was necessary to defend against the
motion

to

set

aside

conflicting affidavits.

was

that

the

appellants

merely

offer

Judge Moffat was setting in the position

similar to a trial judge in making a determination or judgment of
any

other

case.

He was

considering

the

facts which

were

presented to him and the credibility of the evidence and based
thereon entered a judgment.
Appellants assert:
Such a resolution directly violates the rule that a
Court cannot make factual determinations based upon
conflicting affidavits.
(See pages 24 and 25 of
Appellants1 Brief.)
This assertion ignores the fundamental purpose of a judge whom
every day makes

factual determinations based upon conflicting

testimony whether it is offered by affidavit or otherwise.
Appellants also contend that the only evidence presented to
Judge Moffat was contained in the affidavits submitted to him.
As set out in the transcript of the August 31, 1987, hearing,
evidence was also offered by counsel as to the circumstances
surrounding

the

consent.

By analogy, other motions

require the Court to have an evidentiary hearing.

do not

For example,

motions for new trials or motions to set aside default, motions
in limine and motions to dismiss and the like do not require an
-26-

evidentiary hearing but the facts warranting a grant or denial of
said

motions

are

offered

by

counsel

based

testimony and the record before the Court.

upon

proffered

Respondent will not

reiterate its prior argument with regard to waivers except to
state

to the Court

that counsel

for Appellants had

several

opportunities to request an evidentiary hearing and not at one
time prior to the rendering of an adverse decision did Appellants
ever

request

necessary.

or

contend

that

an

evidentiary

hearing

was

In fact, Appellants participated in the hearing on

the motion to set aside the consent and offered oral argument in
defense of the motion and only after Judge Moffat rendered his
decision
should

did Appellants

have been held.

contend

that

Consequently,

an evidentiary

hearing

as set out in Judge

Moffat's Minute Entry attached as Addendum "F", Appellants have
waived their right, if any, to an evidentiary hearing and should
be estopped from setting back and waiting for a decision on the
matter and only then making an objection.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, based upon the foregoing points and authorities,
Respondent hereby respectfully submits to this Court that the
judgment

rendered

by

Judge

-27-

Moffat

was

appropriate

and,

consequently,

this Court should

affirm

the setting

aside of

Respondent's consent and petitioner's petition for adoption.
DATED this _2£ day of May, 1988.

*^2^^^*^^

<A^

RICHARD B. JOHNSON^
Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDA
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ADDENDUM "A"
MOTION TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACT, ORDER AND DECREE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNT
STATE OF UTAH[
*

*

* * * *

*

"

"

.

-

,

.

'

.

.

-

-

•

' • ' •

-

IN THE MATTER OF
THE ADOPTION OF:
INFANT ANONYMOUS,

C i v i l No. A87

)

229

MOTION TO SET ASIDE
FINDINGS OF FACT, ORDER
AND DECREE.

on A u g u s t

BE IT REMEMBERED, t h a t
above-entitled
at

t h e hour

MOFFAT, o n e

of action

cause

of 2;00
of the

p.m. b e f o r e
J u d g es o f

Appellee:

For A d o p t i v e

Parents:

1987,

came on r e g u l a r l y

for

the
hear:

t h e HONORABLE RICHARD H.

the above-named

A P P E A R A N

For t h e

31st,

Court.

C E S

MR. RICHARD B . JOHNSON
A t t o r n e y A t Law
132 7 S o u t h 8 t h E a s t # 3 0 0
Orem, U t a h
84058
MR.
DENNIS V . HASLAM
MR. LINCOLN W. HOBBS
A t t o r n i e s ' A t Law
175 West Second South
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

WHEREUPON the following proceedings took place in
chambers.
1

THE COURT:

2
3

This is in the matter of, title in the

file, adoption of infant anonymous.
I

It's number A87-229

This is the Motion of Tonya Marie Williams, to set

4

aside Findings of Fact, Order and Decree in this matter;an<

5

I take it those refer to the Findings of Facts and Conclu-

6

sions of Law and the Decree of Adoption?

7
8

MR. JOHNSON:
|

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
That I would take it, that would also

mean that we're here to consider the question of the irre10 I

-vocation of the natural mother's consent to the adoption?

11

MR. JOHNSON:

12

THE COURT:

13

Yes, Your Honor.
Very well.

suppose you have the burden.

14

J

"

!

MR. JOHNSON:

It's your Petition, so I

You may proceed.

Judge, I think that the standard tha

applies to this case has been briefed by both sides and

16

there are, however, a couple of highlights that I would

17

like to bring to the Court's attention.

18

The natural mother in this case is twenty-one yean

19

of age.

20

at the time, working on and off. Apparently she did not

21

show, and therefore, the fact that she was pregnant was a

22

mystery with those around her, particularly her mother an

"

others wijth whom she associated.
J

25

This was a first pregnancy.

Was living at home

She had talked to some

persons early on;but the first real contact with the
adoption agencies was around the first of June.

The baby

was born in the latter part of June. At that time
because persons in the household don't know about it, in
essence, she has got a chance to get through this without
anybody knowing it, she contacts these people, in essence
arranges to give the child up for adoption.
Contrary to how the affidavit sounds, as I underst
there was only one time after June 5th, that everyone
meeting together and that was in the lawyer's office.
After that date, she gave birth to the child on a Tuesday
and was in Court on a Wednesday.

And the birth was in th«

early morning;and because consent was given a little late:
about thirty hours later.
Now, it is the contention of the mother, that just
as stated in the affidavit.

On the Saturday after the

consent was taken on a Wednesday or Thursday;on that
Saturday, she called a counselor up and said,"I want the
baby back," and said, " I had a chance to think about this
and I want the baby."

And the counselor told her she wou]

have to talk

Come in the office and talk to her.

to her.

And that's the general arrangment.
Now, the thing that we're relying upon, Judge, isthe misunderstanding that the mother had.

I think counsel

after reading the transcript, accurately stated what the
transcript said;Judge Young said something,

N

Do you

understand that when you sign this consent that you're

1

giving up rights forever?

M

And she says something

2

to the effect, she understood that. And then the Judge

3

asked the question again and she's^cut off in her response

4

But this is the basis of her misunderstanding.

She

5

was told by the counselor that the adoption could not

6

become final for six months;and although she had given hex

7

consent, which she understood was binding at that time,she

8

also understood and thought that she had a right, during

9

that six months to contest the consent;and therefore, the

10

ambiguity or misunderstanding is created as to the reldtit

11

-ship between the six months waiting period that is requi-

12

-red for adoptions in the State of Utah and her right to

13

revoke that consent during that same six months period of

14

time.

15

She was under the assumption that she had that rig

16

that when she called up on Saturday, two days after she

17

signed the consent, that she wanted the child back. And

18

that it was appropriate to do so.

19

Court, she comes before this Court knowing this isfan

20

inconvenience to everybody and not an easy thing for the

21

adoptive parents and not an easy thing for the lawyers or

22

for the Court involved.

23

Her explanation to the

But she wants,more than anything in the world, to

24

have this child restored to her.

She believes that when

25

she went to the adoptions agency that she was acting

immaturely.

That she thought that this was a

period of time in her life

she would be able to avoid b

giving up the child for adoption. And when she saw what
the reaction of the family was, that they were supportiv
and they were willing to stand by her;and that she wante
to have the child with her.
Now, I don't think there is any misunderstanding
to the drugs she's on. And in her affidavit says
on pain medication.

she i

The record reveals that she was on

Tylenol 3, with codeine.

The doctor's affidavit says th

it shouldn't affect her ability to make a knowing choice
I leave that to the Court, coupled with the stress eleme
that she was going through;and in essence, going through
a birth without a father, and without the natural family
aroiiftd her to support her.
Now, Judge, the legal test to be applied in tie ca
has beenstatedsseveral times, and it is to that point th
I would like to address a couple of comments.

The Court

has indicated, in three or four cases which we have cit«
that the Court should allow the setting aside of consent
with liberality unless the rights of third parties have
intervened;and there has been kind of a reliance
that.

upon

My point, and I think what has been misstated in

the briefs is, that hiring a lawyer, the appearance in
Court are all expenses, if Tonya would have said No?» I^<

1

not going to sign the consent ;the only reliance that

2

there is# is that which comes after the consent was signed

3

And that is the difference between June 24th# the time she

4

can raise some money,to get a lawyer and file the motion,

5

which was filed timely.

6

Now, there are several cases, and I think the timing

7

is important.

One of the key cases cited by everyone is

8

In The Matter Of S.

9

there was about a three months delay.

And that case which is a 1977 case,
In fact, I think

10

just short of the three month period under Rule 60-B, by

11

just a couple of days.

12

One of the other key cases was one where there was

13

almost an eight months delay in time;and I think this case

14

where you have a natural mother, who comes in within two

15

days of the time that she gave her consent, says, Ok.

16

would like to revoke it.

17

about trying to raise some money to get a lawyer;gets a

18

lawyer and has the papers filed and a prompt motion.

19

is, it's appropriate under those circumstances.

20

think the adoptive parents could argue any bonding or long

21

term relationship with this child;and of course, as expres

22

-sed by all of the cases, the right of the natural mother

23

is paramount to the extent, that there have been costs

24

incurred that this Court feels are appropriate to be

25

reimbursed my client and is willing to do that.

I

Like the child back and then goei

That

I don't

THE COURT:

Wait a minute.

ask you a question now.

Let me go back and

What you're saying to me, in

effect, is that we should look at the question of whethei
or not, in the language of the case you've cited to me.
In Re:

Adoption of S.

That we should look as of the

time that she called and wanted to revoke her consent tc
determine whether or not the rights or interests of thir
parties have intervened?
MR. JOHNSON:
10 I

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Not as of today.

That's right.

You wouldn't deny

11

that as of today, the rights and interests of third

12

parties have intervened.

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. JOHNSON:

I would think that's right.
Go down the road as far as.an adoptio
But, on the other hand, You know if

16

we filed a motion I think the last of July, so I think

17

about thirty days afterwards we filed the motions and we

18

set the argument before Your Honor within I guess I coul<

19

THECDURT:

20

to interrupt you.

21

position .

22

MR. JOHNSON:

I can find it.

Go ahead.

Didn't mean

I thought I would understand your

That has to be our position.

No

23

Question that the adoptive parents have, in essence, had

24

from the end of June to now, almost two months with that

25

child.

But it is our contention that two months coupled

1

with the timely filing of the consent

and the social

2

worker is saying, well, you're going to have to come down

3

here or whatever.

4

long to file it, Judge.

5

has not filed simply because of some whim.

6

child more than anything in the world and she feels that i:

7

the Court understands that she bore the burden of this

8

pregnancy without anyone around her

9

guess escaping on a day to day basis of not anyone knowing

She gets a lawyer and just takes that
This is a motion that my client
She wants that

knowing of it, just I

10

that coupled with the stress

of birth that she had;and

11

having somebody's shoulder to cry on in the form of the

12

counselor.

13

with a supportive family looking at this I think it's

14

appropriate if she wants a right to have that child.

15

most importantly, I think that ihhterently, this six months

16

ruling is one that is ambiguous.

17

have to sit and talk about.

18

consent is given and a layperson is told "an adoption does

19

not become final for six months;and whether the counselor

20

or my client perceived it the way she did, her understand:

21

is, that until that adoption becomes final, that during tl

22

period of six months she had a right to reassert her righl

23

to that child.

24

gave it; during that six months period of time*she had th<

25

right to revoke it.

It gets her to the point of that upon adoption

And

It's one I think we all

We understand that if that

That the determination was bidding when si

And I think that is sufficient under

the case law that we citef to warrant the Court
allowing the withdrawal of the consent and setting asid<
of the Findings and Conclusions of the Decree of Adoptic
4

THE COURT:

5

MR. HASIAM:

Thank you, Mr. J0hnson. Mr. Haslam\
Your Honor,I think that I agree

6

generally, with the legal propositions presented by Mr.

7

Johnson.

8

the same cases;and that is In Re: S.

9

important factor here today, Your Honor, is not the cone

1°

The cases thatf we both have cited are essenti
I think the most

of revocation or timely revocation.

"

Mr. Johnson would appear to lead the Courtto belie

*2

that revocation is something that can be done in cases c

*3

this nature, much as a revocation of acceptance can be d

14

under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code;if you

,5

it timely, then it's okay.

*6

adoption especially, where other rights have intervened.

17

In this case, the transcript of the hearing before

*8

That's not the case, in an

Judge Murphy, which is in the Court's file.

*9

THE COURT:

20

MR. HASIAM:

I read it.
The Court specifically asked the ke

2

question: Was she under the influence of any drugs and

22

did she understand the finality of what was about to tak<

23

place.

*

24
2

*

The law that we have cited in our Memorandum indical
that there is a presumption of regularity to Court

1

proceedings and that's

why a judge signs and witnesse

2

this consent.

3 1

do it and not acceptable for a Notary to do it.

4

be by a judge;one of the very few people in the entire

5

State of Utah

6

important proceeding.

7

It's not acceptable for the Court Clerk to

that can witness an adoption.

It has to

It's a very

Ms. Williams had the opportunity to spend approximate

8

twelve and a half hours counseling with the counselor at

9

the Utah Women's Health Center;and that was from March 31*

10

until the birth of the baby, which was June 23rd.

11

more than two months, Your Honor.

12

That's

The affidavit of the counselor indicates that she di<

13

not attempt to persuade this young woman as to what kind

14

alternative was best to her.

15

a neutral fashion.

16

after delivery.

17

proceedings. Judge Murphy specifically asked this natural

18

mother if she had seen the baby and she said yes.

19

seen the baby;and she, even after that, she came in and

20

executed the consent before the Court.

21

And that she presented it i

The consent was given over thirty hou

And you'll note in the transcript of the

I have

In this instance, it is the moving party who has the

22

burden of proving fraud, duress or coercion.

The Court i

23

knows that it's a terrific burden.

24

cases before the Court indicate that it has to be proved

25

to a very, very high level.

Not sure that the

But fraud is a nasty claim.

Duress is a nasty claim and coercion is a nasty claim
This woman went to a third party, a professional
counselor for help.
Your Honor.

She chose to not confide in her parenl

She also went to a physician, who was licensee

She1 *^an?'otoacl^tir!i^ian.The obstetrician did not hotice*>?ny
reluctance on this young woman1s part.
Under the question of reliance,Your Honor, I can
represent to the Court and the Court's file will indicate,
that an order issued at the time the consent was signed,
placing custody with my client, who have since that time,
or a few hours thereafter, accepted this child from the
hospital into their own home.
Theyfve paid all the medical bills, all of the legal
bills, all of the social workers1 bills that have been
invdlved.
case

At this time, I don't believe there has been a

made out of fraud on anybody's part or duress.

This

woman was not talked into it by anybody and there is no
evidence of any coercion on anybody's pairt. This woman
came to our office seeking assistance in placing the child
Not as though we had temcajdling her for some period of
time and submit it on that basis, Your Honor.
MR. JOHNSON:

Two quick comments.

are cited, do not leave it with fraud.

The cases that

The matter, as I

stated in my brief, no question it says that if the rights
or interests of third parties have not intervened the Court

1

1

liberally permit withdrawal of such consent.

It is

2

otherwise

3

have exerted efforts and expense anchform emotional attach-)

4

-ments, based upon the consent of the natural mother.

5

this case, if the lawyer and the social worker convey to

6

the adoptive parents the filing of the motions, which I

7

assume that they did;and timely advised these people that

8

the natural mother had some problems.

9

months.

10

where adoptive parents in reliance and good faitl

In Re:

The Adoption of K

In

It has only been 2

., the 1970 case, the

11

Court indicated, for good cause shown the Court ought to

12

consider carefully the welfare of the child.

13

that those indicate that the test is not one of fraud, it*!

14

one where this Court can look at the circumstances.

15

It is always surprising to me

And I think

in analysing things.

16

Case Rule 60-B allows this Court to set aside a Judgment ••

17

within three montns and for

18

-ble neglect, good cause showing and that type of thing

19

that relates to money judgments and those types of things.

20

Now, in this case, it would appear to me, that whei

21

the natural mother, who has her life with a young baby wit

22

whom she wants a relationship pending;where there is an

23

honest ambiguity as to what the meaning of the consent is;

24

that it is appropriate to allow the setting aside of that

25

decree'fcr good cause shown.

60-B-l, for showing of excusa

THE COURT:

Mr. Johnson, so that I understand you

position. Would you, in this case, feel that the consent
could have been revoked for whatever reason;that is, that
the mother has an absolute right to revoke her consent at
any time?
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

I don't Judge.
Well, let's not say at any time. Sa

at any time within the first six months?
MR. JOHNSON:

I don't think so.

I think there—tl

case law says that the consent has a degree of regularity
attached to it.

I think that's the law.

But in this

case, I think you have to take each case as'.it goes.
We've got a young mother who comes through a very
stressfull pregnancy, no one knowing;and honestly, Judge,
I really think this six months issue is a problem.. I thir
it is easy for lawyers and judges after you've been throuc
it to understand.

But when you tell-the social worker

tells her or she tells somebody elfte, that, Look, doesn't
become final for six months.

It's easy I think,

for a

natural mother to say, Ok. Then I have six months.

It

isn't final yet;and that is the first thing that my client]
indicated to me when she came to the office and tried to
talk to her about what it meant;and I think that that
ought to be an appropriate basis.
THE COURT:

Well, I guess what you.fte saying to mel

1

1

is, assuming we don't have the problem of ."intervening

2

rights or interest; that the natural'mot her .'ban revoke.her

3

consent at any time for whatever reason is satisfactory to

4

herself.

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

THE COURT:

Or satisfactory to the Court?
Allright.

And what I have to do then

7

is believe that her revocation, believe that her understand

8

-ing, the finality being six months down the road, instead

9

of the time she gave her consent, is clearly different thai

10

what she has said at the time the consent was taken, becaus

11

it—you just have to read it, but—

12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
"Q.

Why is it that you think it's in

14

the best interest of the child that you relinquish any

15

rights you have and consent to the adoption?

16 I

A.

I just cannot take care of her financially.

17

Q.

Do you understand—for want of a better word—

18

the finality of this?

That if it goes forward, that you

19

relinquish all parental rights forever.

20

A.

Yes, I do.

21

Q.

And you are doing this freely and voluntarily.

22

A.

Uh huh. (Affirmative)

23

Q.

No one has forced you to do this.

24

A.

Nobody has.

25

Q.

Did you see that child after the child was b03

It's my own decision.

A.
day.

Not;*after she was bornf but I did later that

I've been down there three times.
Q.

Did you make up your mind to relinquish your

parental rights after you had seen the child?
A.

What do you mean?

5;^ve decided all along to

have this adoption go through, and I know that there will
not be any rights for me t o — M

Then of course trailed off

and the Court made another statement.
MR. JOHNSON:

Suggest one reading to the Court.

If you look at that question," Do you understand—for want
of a better word—the finality of this?

That if it goes

forward, that you relinquish all parental rights forever.11
So she is thinking—
THE COURT:

Six months down the road.

MR. JOHNSON:

Down here, this is the—in my mind

the key statement on line 21 on page 3:MQ.

Did you make u

your mind to relinquish your parental rights after you had
seen the child?

A.

What do you mean?

I've decided all

along to have this adoption go through, and I know that
there will not be any rights for me to—"and I think
counsel, who is there, I cettainly was not there.

In the

brief it is said that she was cut off or she trailed off,
trying to form a thought and the Court just proceeded.

Bu

I think that reading is consistent with her proposition
that, Gee, I understood that if the six months goes by,the

1

1

adoption is granted.

It's done.

And I could

2

represent to the Court that was the first thing she

3

indicated to me?that she thought that she had been misled

4

into thinking that she had that time, because, otherwise,

5

it's strange for her to call up on Saturday, which in the

6

affidavit

7

says, " I want my child back."

8

Judge.

9

of the social worker, she acknowledges, and

THE COURT:

But; that's all we've got

A strange thought just struck my mine

10

and that is, I really shouldrift be hearing this.

11

who ought to hear it is Judge Murphy.

12

took the consentrand in effect, I would be, in effect, if

13

I rule in your favor, I will be overruling to a certain

14

extent, on a fellow judge.

15

consent.

16
17
IS

The guj

He is the one that

But really, he took the

May be he ought to hear this.

MR. HASIAM:

We presented that to Mr. Burgi, and

Mr. Burgi suggested that I bring that to you.
THE COURT:

Well, not sure I agree with Don in tha

19

case.

Tell, you what I'll do.

I am not afraid to make a

20

decision.

21

to see whether or not he wants to make the decision.

But I do think I ought to talk to Judge Murphy

22

MR. JOHNSON:

23

THE COURT:

Allright, Your Honor.
And I want to look at a couple of cas«

24

I'll takfe the matter under advisement and advise you todaj

25

If you're going back to Provo, I'll call your office.

I']

advise you today, either my decision in the case or
whether or not I think it should go back to Judge Murphy
If I can reach Murphy today, and if I can't reach him,it
will Ijave to be tommorrow*

Either way, we111 get the ma

taken care of*
C E R T I F I C A T E

SALT LAKE COUNTY)

:
STATE OF UTAH

ss.

)

I, Hal M. Walton, do hereby certify that I am
a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah;that
on August 31st, 1987, I appeared before the above-named
Court and reported in Stenotype the proceeding matters
contained in the 17 pages of transcription herein and that
the same is a true and correct rendering of my shorthand
notes as reported by me.

H.M. Walton C.S.R,

Dated:

May 6, 1988
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

In the Matter of the
Adoption of:

Case No. A-87-229

4

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
INFANT ANONYMOUS

5
6

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 24th day of June,

7

1987, the above-entitled action came on regularly for

8

hearing before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge

9 I in the Third Judicial District for the State of Utah,
10

and was reported by me, Gayle B. Campbell, a Registered
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the

11
State of Utah.
12
A P P E A R A N C E S :
13

Lincoln W. Hobbs
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

For Petitioners:

u |
15
16
17 S
18
19
20

F1LEO iNCLSa',*'-:--

21
22

AUG -7 1987

23
GAYLE
24
25

a. CAMpeeu •

CfariHE.O ZHORIHAUO i3E?ORTE»
. V U r U * € CITY. UTAH

•"Yl/tf

rfl'Vp

Salt Lake City, Utah

June 24, 1987
P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

This is in the matter of the adopti

of Infant Anonymous, Case No. A-87-229.

Lincoln Hobbs

on behalf of the petitioners is present before the court,
along with the natural mother.
go head.

Mr. Hobbs, why don't you

Let's have the mother sworn in, and you put

on what you believe is necessary.
MR. HOBBS:
9 |] today
10

I have brought before the court
who had an infant female born

at the Holy Cross Hospital yesterday morning at about
5:00 o'clock* or 4:19 a.m.

She is before the court to

11
give her consent to the adoption of her infant child,
12
and I have met with her in the hall and provided her with
13

a copy of the document which she will be signing, the

14

affidavit relinquishing her paternal rights.

IS

read the same and she indicated to me she understands

16

the same.

17

respecting the knowing consent on her behalf.

She has

If you would like to ask her any questions

18

THE COURT:

Let me see your affidavit.

MR. HOBBS:

It's among these documents.

THE COURT:

Okay.

19
20
21
22

(I
having been duly sworn, was examined and testified on
her oath as follows:
EXAMINATION

23
24
25

BY THE COURT:
Mr. Hobbs has indicated that
2

1 || you have read this affidavit.
2 f

Is that true?

A

Yes, I've read it.

Q

And you are

A

Yes.

Q

And you are the natural mother of the child

in question, who was born on June 23, 1987.
A

Yes, I am.

Q

Why is it that you think it's in the best

8 8 interest of the child that you relinquish any rights you
9 8 have and consent to the adoption?
10
11
word —

A

I just cannot take care of her financially.

Q

Do you understand —

the finality of this?

for want of a better

That if it goes forward,

12
that you relinquich all parental rights forever.
13
A

Yes, I do.

Q

And you are doing this freely and voluntari

15

A

Uh huh.

16

Q

No one has forced you to do this,

17

A

Nobody has.

Q

Did you see that child after the child

A

Not right after she was born, but I did

14

18

(Affirmative)

It's my own decision.

was born.
19
20
later that day.
21
22
23

Q

I've been down there three times.
Did you make up your mind to relinquish

your parental rights after you had seen the child?
A

What do you mean?

I've decided all along

24

to have this adoption go through, and I know that there

25

will not be any rights for me to

—

1 1

THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Hobbs, is there

2 | anything that needs to be a matter of record and under
3

I oath for the Order to be signed?
MR. HOBBS:

I would just have two matters

I would want on the record.
EXAMINATION
BY MR. HOBBS:
Q

Are you under the influence of any drugs

8 1 that may impair your ability to make a knowing consent
9 I at this time?
A

10

No/ I'm not.
MR. HOBBS:

11

The other thing I would like

on the record, I would like the record to reflect that
12
I have brought a certificate of search for acknowledgment
13

of paternity by the father.

14
15

As of 9:01 a.m. this morning

there have been no acknowledgment of paternity.
|

THE COURT:

All right.

why

16 I don't you go ahead and sign that affidavit.

Fill in the

17 I d a t e f the 24th day of J u n e , and sign it on the table there.
(Document signed)

18

THE COURT:

Are you taking any pain medication

19
now?
20
THE WITNESS:
21
22

THE COURT;

All right.

interfere with your ability to

23 II

THE WITNESS:

24
25

Just for my stitches.

Q

—

And that doesn't

—

No, it doesn't.

know and understand what you're doing

here.
4

THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT:

All right. The affidavit having

been signed, and having heard the testimony, it's appropriate
that the Order as submitted be signed, and I'll do it
at this time. All right.
Good luck to you.
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)

5

1 I

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
State of Utah

2

County of Salt Lake

)
:
)

ss.

I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, do hereby certify that
I am a Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public
in and for the State of Utah;
That as such reporter, I attended the hearing
7

I of the foregoing matter and thereat reported in stenotype

8 1 all of the testimony and proceedings had; that thereafter,
g | my notes were transcribed into typewriting under my direction,
and pages 1 through 5 constitute a full, true, and correct

10

report of the same.

11

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah this, j ? ^

day

12
of August, 1987.
,

GAYLE > B T C & M P B E L L ,

..

14 H

My Commission E x p i r e s :
15 | 6 J a n u a r y
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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ADDENDUM "C"
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN BAGLEY

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Stilt Lake County Utah

Dennis V. Haslam (#1408)
Lincoln W. Hobbs (#4848)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Post Office Box 2668
Sa]t Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222

AUQ 241987
H. Dixon Hind.'c>A£ter'< 3rd Oist. Court

By _y^2^CZr^ ""

Attorneys for Petitioners

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the
Adoption of

AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN BAGLEY

INFANT ANONYMOUS.
STATE OF UTAH

Case No. A-87-229

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Susan Bagley, having been duly sworn, does depose and
state that:
1.

I am a counselor, employed by the Utah Women*s Health

Center, with various responsibilities in counseling patients
of the Center, including the counseling of pregnant women who
have made a decision to place a child for adoption.
2.

1 have a bachelor of science degree in Behavioral

Science and liealth from the University of Utah, and am Assistant Director of the Utah Women's Health Center.
3.

I have, in the medical records of my patient,
, a signed and notarized Consent to Release of

Personal and Medical Information which authorizes me to re-

V.»>-» N *

lease to Winder & Haslam and to allow them to inspect and obtain copies of any and all of

"personal or medi-

cal records, bills, notes, x-rays and medical reports pertaining to (her) phsyical or mental condition, past, present or
future, upon a presentation of this consent or a photocopy
thereof. "
4.

I first became acquainted with

on or

about March 31, 1987, when she came to the Utah Women's Health
Center to determine the duration of her then-existing pregnancy,

was at that time, and continues to be to

the best of my knowledge, unmarried.
5.

Following

She is 21 years of age.

initial consultation with me

at the Center, I met with and counseled her on several occasions for a total of 12i hours respecting her decision to
place her child for adoption.
6.

During the course of my counseling of

, I

did not advocate the option of adoption over any other of the
alternatives available to her in her situation.
7.

During the course of my counseling of

she continually affirmed that her desire respecting her pregnancy was to place her child for adoption, and that an adoption would be in the best interests of her child, as she was
unmarried and did not have the means to support the child.
8.

At no time during my counseling of

iid

she express any reservations respecting her decision to place

-2-

the child for adoption, other than the natural and expected
feelings of ambiguity in such a situation.
9.

After

reached the final decision to

place the child for adoption, we arranged an appointment and
visited with Lincoln W. Hobbs, attorney for petitioners herein, and discussed the possibilities of a private adoption of
her then unborn child-

On or about June 5, 1987, at approxi-

mately 11:00 a.m.,

and I met with Mr. Hobbs at

his office at the Jaw firm of Winder & Haslam.
10.

During that meeting, and in my presence, Mr. Hobbs

advised

that:
a.

He would be paid by and acting as attorney for

the petitioners herein, and as such could not provide any
legal advice to

He further advised her that

should she have a legal question, she should direct the same
to independent counsel, as he had an apparent conflict of interest in advising her of her legal rights.
b.

He further told her that it would be necessary

for her to visit with and sign a consent in the presence of a
judge, and that following her signature on that consent, her
rights to the infant would be terminated, and she could not
thereafter change her mind and obtain custody of the child.
11.

Following that meeting, I had several other conversa-

tions with

in which we discussed the finality of

a decision she was to make respecting relinquishment of her
child for adoption.

-3-
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12.

On June 22, 1987, I was notified that

had gone into labor and was expected to deliver at Holy Cross
Hospital,

I met her at the hospital and sat with and assisted

her through labor and delivery of her child,
13.

During a long labor,

repeatedly stated

her wishes to have the baby as soon as possible so she could
return to her home and her "normal" lifestyle.

During the

labor, she waivered as to whether she wanted to know the sex
of her child or whether she would want to see her child after
its delivery.
14.

At no time during labor did she ever express any res-

ervations about her decision to place her child for adoption.
15.

On or about June 24, 1987, approximately 30 hours

after the delivery of her child,

and I met with

Mr. Hobbs at the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, prior to an appointed, scheduled meeting with
Judge Michael R. Murphy of that Court, for the purpose of obtaining

consent to the adoption and relinquish-

ment of her parental rights.
16.

At that time, and in my presence, Mr. Hobbs provided
with, for her inspection, a copy of an Affidavit

Relinquishing Parental Rights and Consenting to Adoption and
asked her to review the same.
17.

In my presence,

read the Affidavit.

Following her reading of the Affidavit, Mr. Hobbs asked

if she understood the contents of the document.
stated she did.

Mr- Hobbs told her that, in the

presence of the judge, she would most likely be read a copy of
the consent, asked if she understood the contents, asked if
she understood her relinquishment would be a final decision,
and would further be asked if she were under the influence of
any drugs which might affect her ability to make a decision.
18.

Thereafter, Mr. Hobbs,

and I proceeded

to the chambers of Judge Michael R. Murphy, at which time, in
the presence of a court reporter,

signed the Af-

fidavit Relinquishing Parental Rights and Consenting to Adoption.
19.

Following the taking of

consent in the

judge's chambers, she and I went to lunch together in Salt
Lake City.

For approximately 2 hours we talked about her

decision and about how she could now return to her normal activities.

During our lunch, she appeared in full control of

all of her mental facilities, and did not appear to be unduly
tired or affected by stress.
20.. During the course of my counseling of
she advised me she did not desire her mother, with whom she
resided in Lindon, Utah, to know of her pregnancy.
21.

As a result of her request, and in light of the fact

that I found her to be a mature, intelligent and sophisticated
woman, I respected her decision and did not at any time allow

-5-
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her mother to become aware of her pregnancy.
22.

To the best of my knowledge, information and belief,
mother was unaware of her daughter's pregnancy

until several days following the delivery and
return home.
23.

Several days after the consent was given, I was con-

tacted by

who advised me she had spoken to her

mother about the pregnancy and the adoption, and that her
mother had expressed serious reservations about her daughter's
desire and decision to place the child for adoption.
then advised me she had "changed her mind" with respect to the consent she had provided in the presence of Judge
Michael R. Murphy of the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County.
24.

Since that conversation with

, I have had

no further contact or communication with her.
DATED this -/J l

day of August, 1987.
/

Susan Bagley
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
gust, 1987.

My Commission Expires:

^

/? *' d?/ of Aur

.-'

NOTARY P U B L I C ^
Residing in Salt Lake County, UT

/

1LUUJ-
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V. * v-'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN BAGLEY to be mailed, first
class, postage prepaid, this

day of August, 1987, to:

Mr. Richard B. Johnson
Attorney for
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, Utah 84058
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ADDENDUM "D"

AFFIDAVIT OF TONYA WILLIAMS

•riLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Selt Lake County Utafi

JUL 22 1987
U. Dixon Hindtey.C^ 3rd Dist. Court

RICHARD B. JOHNSON #1722
Attorney for Movant
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 225-1632

By — f & -

jfeputy Clerk"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADOPTION OF:

Case No.

Infant Anonymous,

STATE OF UTAH

f\

Vl~<P^\

)

:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
, after first being duly sworn,

deposes

and says:
1.

I

am

the

natural mother of the child involved in this

matter.
2.

I signed the attached Affidavit

relinquishing

parental

rights and consenting to adoption.
3.

At

the time I signed that Affidavit, I had been on pain

medication. Prior to going to the Court, I had significant doubts
about giving the child up for adoption.

I believe that the

pain

medication

together

with the stress that I was under because of

childbirth simply left me without sufficient will and strength to
properly evaluate that matter.
4. After I left the hospital and got my strength back, I was
resolute that I did not want to lose

my

child

and

wanted

the

rights to raise the child. I believe that had it not been for the
medication

and stress of childbirth, that I would have indicated

to the persons involved that I did not want to give my

child

up

for adoption.
5. I do not have monies to fight this matter legally, and it
took

me

the time from June 24, 1987 to to the time that I hired

Richard Johnson to raise sufficient monies to be able to file the
appropriate documents with the Court to request that the

consent

to set aside and that the Decree of Adoption be set aside.
6.

Aside from the medication and stress, I was informed and

believed that the Decree of Adoption did not become final for six
months

and

that

I had that period of time in which some action

could be taken. I do not understand that the giving of my consent
and the signing of the Affidavit were the end of the
that
mind.

there

was

in

fact

matter

and

a period of time that could change my

7.
rights

I want very much to raise my child and have my
restored.

The

child

parental

means everything to me and I would

greatly appreciate the assistance of the Court in allowing me

to

have my rights with the child restored.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1987.

Movant
SUBSCRIBED

&

SWORN
, 198

to
.

before

me

this

day of

NOTARY PUBLIC
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

RESIDING AT:

ooo«

MAILING CERTIFICATE
certify
that
on
the
<^Q
day
of
1987, I mailed a true andcorrect copy of
the/forgoing, postage prepaid, to:
^-v I

hereby
hereb

Lincoln W. Hobbs
Dennis V. Haslam
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668

^lAl/lAolOl
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ooooM

ADDENDUM "E"

MOTION TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE

FILED «N CLERK 5 OFFICE
Salt Lafce County Utah

JUL 2 2i987
RICHARD B. JOHNSON #1722
Attorney for Movant
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 225-1632

H.Oh«n/Hin*y.CWc WOW. Court

r

By

'uty ClerU

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADOPTION OF:

MOTION TO SET ASIDE
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND DECREE

Infant Anonymous.

Case No. / f ^ V ^ ?

COMES NOW

and moves this Court pursuant

to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for

an

Order

setting aside the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of

Adoption

and

allowing

the movant,

to

withdraw her consent to the adoption.
There

is

attached

hereto

and

incorporated

herein

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Motion.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1987.

<£.

1CHARD B. JOHNSO
Attorney for Movant

a

MAILING CERTIFICATE
hereby

certify
that
on
the ^Q^Lday
of
1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of
the fori going, postage prepaid, to:
Lincoln W. Hobbs
Dennis V. Haslam
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668

(pAmeta

^UIMJWNIUJ

1, r v -

-*

rlLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lai;e County Utah

JUL 2 2 1987
H. Dixon H'nesey. &e:H 3rd Oist. Court

RICHARD B. JOHNSON #1722
Attorney for Movant
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 225-1632

By

$-W^H~':!ty Clerk
©eputv

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACTS,
ORDER AND DECREE

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADOPTION OF:
Infant Anonymous,

Case Number:

COMES NOW
Richard B.

/j-ft^^A^?

, by and through her attorney,

Johnson, and

submits

the

following

Memorandum

Points and Authorities in Support of

of

' Motion

to Set Aside Findings of Fact, Order and Decree.
ARGUMENT
POINT .1
THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY HAS
JURISDICTION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF THE RELIEF SHE REQUESTS.
In

adoption

cases the courts are given broad discretion to

formulate a decree which is equitable and consistent with
policy.

The

Supreme

Court

of

public
Utah in,

D P v. Social Service & Child W. Dept., 431 P.2d 547, 551 (1967),

i\&jfJJt<*

quoting prior case law said:
. .the important phrase of the case is that it recognized
the right of a natural mother to revoke written consent, and
as pointed out, when the question of undue influence is an
issue "the court should carefully scrutinize the evidence
lest an honest, worthy and well-meaning natural parent be
unjustly depraved of her child."
Therefore, the courts not only have jurisdiction to hear the
facts and make a decision, but the courts are also held to a high
level

of scrutiny to protect the rights of the natural mother to

be with her child.
The

Utah

Supreme

In Re Adoption of F

Court

further

stated

in

488 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1971):

. .The mother of an illegitimate child has the right both
to its custody and to relinquish that right if for any
reason she so desires. If she so decides and freely and
voluntarily signs a release and consent for adoption, it is
binding the same as any other contract. It is, of course,
true that if no rights or interests of third parties have
intervened, the courts are quite liberal in permitting the
withdrawal of such a consent.
The

fact

that

did not understand and

freely and voluntarily consent to the adoption
along

with

the

fact

of

her

daughter

that petitioner forthwith moved the Court

within a few days to regain her daughter should weigh heavily
movant's favor.
-2-

in

POINT II
THERE ARE LEGAL GROUNDS WHICH JUSTIFY THE
REVOCATION OF THE PETITIONER'S CONSENT TO ADOPTION.
The

standard

for

revocation of consent to adoption is set

out in In the Matter of S., 572 p.2d 1370, 1374 (1977):
A duly executed consent can be avoided only be showing the
agreement was not entered into voluntarily but was induced
through
duress,
undue
influence,
or
under
some
misrepresentation or.deception; or other grounds which would
justify release from the obligations of any contract.
It seems quite clear that petitioner signed the consent from
with

the

belief that she had six months before the adoption was

final and during
consent.

The

that

belief

period
that

of

time

she

could

revoke

consent was not final as of June 24,

1987, was based on the representations and statements.
applies

the

When

one

the standard set out above, the consent agreement should

be revoked based on the fact that there was
and

her

petitioner

signed

the

a

misrepresentation

agreement with the justifiable

deception that she could regain custody of her

daughter

time

she was under the

within

the

next

6

months

and

while

at

any

influence of pain medication.
In
exercised

addition
undue

to

misrepresentation,

influence.

The
-3-

essence

the

persons

involved

of undue influence is

unfair persuasion.
(Wash,

See In Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d

641,

181

App., 1982).

The ultimate question is whether the result was produced by
means that seriously impaired the free and
competent
exercise of judgment. Such factors as the unfairness of the
resulting bargain, the unavailability of independant advice,
and
the
susceptibility
of
the person persuaded are
circumstances to be taken into account in determining
whether there was unfair persuasion.
1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 177, comment b at 491
(1981)
Certainly
the

consent,

the petitioner's judgment, at the time she signed
was

representations

impaired

that

there

by

the

was

a

drugs

taken

and

the

six month period before the

consent agreement was final.
Additional light is shed
In the Matter of Anderson,

on
589

the
P.2d

issue
957

standard the court applied in the case was

by

the

(Idaho,
whether

court
1978).

the

in
The

consent

was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, and with full
awareness of the legal consequences.
these requirements.
the

effect

at

the

Movant does not meet any of

She was relying on the misrepresentations of
consent.

She

was in no position to make a

intelligent decision regarding the permanency of her consent.

-4-

Similar
addressed

issues
by

to

the

the

child

raised

Washington

In Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d
illigitimate

ones

178

Court
(1982).

in

this

case

of

Appeals in

The

received aid from an agency.

mother

of

an

As a result of

the advice of her physician and the agency she signed
agreement.

were

a

consent

The court further stated:

During that time everyone advocated that she place her child
for adoption. She was never clearly informed by the agency
that even though it had spent money on her behalf, she was
nonetheless free to retain her child and return to Michigan.
She was not encouraged to consider alternatives and had no
opportunity to reflect or seek independant advice. Although
she was told the relinquishment was final, she was also
improperly advised that another mother changed her mind 7
months after relinquishment and recovered her child.
.Additionally, she challenged
her
relinquishment
immediately upon returning to Michigan. The findings further
show this environment created in Miss. Perry's mind an
obligation without option, to repay the agency's expenses by
relinquishing her rights to the child. In view of these
findings, the close relationship that must have developed
and Miss Perry's dependancy upon the agency, we hold the
court's conclusion must stand and the relinquishment be set
aside.
In light of the above case,
relief.

In

petitioner

should

be

allowed

the Washington case as well as the case at issue the

mothers were not fully informed by the agencies of their
Neither mother was encouraged to seek legal advice.
-5-

rights.

Both mothers

were

faced with outside pressures from their family.

lead both mothers to believe that there
after

was

a

The agency

period

of

time

signing the consent that they could regain their children.

Therefore, just as the consent was

revoked

in

the

case

cited

above so also should the petitioner be released from her consent.
POINT III
NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER TO REVOKE HER CONSENT TO
ADOPTION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
The

Supreme

Court

of

Utah

state in

D P v. Social Service & Child W. Dept., 431 P.2d 547 (1967):
I take it that most everyone will agree that there is a
strong presumption that a baby is better off with its
natural mother; that such presumption must be overcome only
by clear and convicting evidence; that even though a written
consent
is
given
her it is revocable under certain
circumstances.
. • .The ties by which a mother and child are bound together
should not be severed except for grave and weighty reasons.
The fact that this child may receive, at the hands of
appellants, a better home that respondent can provide, is
not sufficient reason for depraving her of her offspring.
The

natural

affection

which

accompanies

mother is a relationship which should be
the

courts.

Public

securely

a child and her
protected

by

policy dictates that children should not be

severed from their mother unless it is the clear intention of the
-6-

mother to do so.
even

though

The court in the above cited case

the

mother

was

destitute

and

had

stated

that

no means of

providing for the child, and that the adoptive parents could more
adequately give the child the necessities of

life,

there

still

existed insufficient grounds for awarding custody to the adopting
parents.

Id.

at 552.
CONCLUSION
therefore respectfully requests the Court to

revoke the consent agreement and allow her child to

be

returned

to her.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1987.

'A,

RICHARD B. JOHNSO
Attorney for Movant

-7-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
certify
that
on
the
J^)^1987, I mailed a true and correct
orfe^oing/ ]postage prepaid, to:
the foregoing/
hereby

day of
copy of

Lincoln W. Hobbs
Dennis V. Haslara
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
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ADDENDUM "F"

MINUTE ENTRY DATED SEPTEMBER 25, 1987

Salt Lake County Utah

SEP 25 1987
KOixonH.rKitey. Clor* 3rd Oist. C o u r t

S^Wy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION
OF:

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO, A-87-229

INFANT ANONYMOUS,

The

"Protective

Motion

for

New

Trial,

Or,

in

the

Alternative, Amendment from Judgment or Relief From Judgment" of
the petitioners in the above-entitled matter came on for hearing
before

the

Court

on

September

23, 1987.

The

Court heard

argument, and has carefully examined the Memoranda and cases
cited to it by counsel for both the petitioners and the natural
mother, and now denies the above-described Motions.
The reason for said denial is that while the matter should
perhaps have initially been heard by the judge that took the
consent, this Court discussed that matter with counsel for the
parties at the time of the initial hearing herein, and neither
party expressed a desire to have the judge who took the consent
hear the matter.

In addition, the matter was submitted on

Affidavits and oral argument, without any request for the entry
of additional evidence.

It is the Court's opinion that had the

parties asked either to have the original judge hear the matter,
or have an evidentiary hearing, both of said motions would have
been granted.

However, having not done so, this Court is of the

opinion that those matters have been waived.

It has been urged

INFANT ANONYMOUS

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE TWO

that the question of having the matter heard by the judge who
took the original consent cannot be waived.

However, this Court

is of the opinion that is not a correct statement and that, in
fact, such waiver did take place herein.

Therefore, this Court

rules as above set forth, and the provisions of the Minute Entry,
dated September 1, 1987, will remain in full force and effect.
The Court orders that the custody of the child be returned
forthwith to the natural mother.

The natural mother's attorney

will prepare the Order. /T

ATTEST
h. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK
By
fc
C^pf?,(V^
Deputy ClorK

0(30068

ADDENDUM "G"

MINUTE ENTRY DATED SEPTEMBER 1, 1987

'0Q7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION
OF:

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. A-87-229

INFANT ANONYMOUS,

The Court having considered the pleadings on file herein,
together with the Affidavits and argument of counsel, hereby
grants the Motion of

to withdraw her consent

to the adoption of her natural child known herein as Infant
Anonymous, who was born June 23, 1987 at Holy Cross Hospital in
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
The Court recognizes that any decision that it makes in this
matter is going to be emotionally disturbing to one or the other
of the parties herein. The Court is convinced, however, that a
reading of the transcript of the proceedings at which the natural
mother's consent was taken is not inconsistent and, in fact,
implies that her consent is not final, and that the proceedings
would have to "go forward."

While the Court does not find fault

with the judge that took the consent, when the language used
therein at that time, jjt

is considered in view of the allegations

of the natural mother that she was told that the adoption would
not become final for six months, which she took to mean that she
could withdraw her consent at any time during that six month
period, it becomes apparent that she probably did not knowingly

INFANT ANONYMOUS

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

consent to the release of her parental rights on an unconditional
basis.

The language involved is found on lines 11, 12 and 13 of

page 3, where the Court said, "Do you understand —
of a better word —
forward,

that

vou

the finality of this?
relinquish

all

parental

for the want

That if it goes
rights

forever,"

(Emphasis supplied)•
The Court is further impressed by the fact that the natural
mother did not consult with members of the family, including her
own mother, until after the birth of the child, but was consulted
only by a counselor at the Utah Women's Health Center•

Again,

not in any way to impune the capacity or capability of the said
counselor, nevertheless, the natural mother, after consulting
with her own mother, decided that she wanted her child back, and
as evidence thereof, within three days after the consent had been
taken

(which was taken about 3 0 hours after the birth), she

advised

the counselor that she wanted the child back.

She

thereafter filed the Petition herein as soon as possible in view
of her financial conditions, which was within 3 0 days of the date
that she had given the consent•
Under the circumstances, it is the Court's opinion that the
mother did not freely and voluntarily given an unconditional
release of her parental rights, that she was acting under a
mistaken belief that the adoption would not become final for six
months, and that she had the right to change her mind within that

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE THREE

INFANT ANONYMOUS

six month period.

The Court finds that if there was, in fact,

less than a full, knowing, unconditional release of the parental
rights, the equities in the matter weigh in favor of setting the
consent aside, and the Court so orders.
The

Court

further

orders that custody

returned forthwith to the natural mother.

of the child be

The natural mother is

ordered to repay to the adoptive parents the reasonable costs
they have incurred in this matter.

She may have a period of two

years to pay those costs in equal monthly installments.
The natural mother's attorney will prepare the Order.

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK
By

,K

.QQ&^JLQ
OepKity Clerk

ADDENDUM "H"
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722
Attorney for Movant
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 225-1632
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

IN THE MATTER OF
THE ADOPTION OF:
INFANT ANONYMOUS,

Civil No. A-87-229
Defendant,

This

matter

Honorable

having

Richard

H.

come

on

for

hearing

before

the

Moffat on the 31st day of August, 1987.

The natural mother was present and represented by her attorney,
Richard B.

Johnson.

The adoptive parents were not present nor

represented by their attorneys Lincoln W.
Haslam.

The

V.

natural mother having filed a Motion to Set Aside

the Findings

of

Adoption

this

in

Hobbs and Dennis

Fact,

Conclusions

matter

of

Law,

and

Decree

of

and to withdraw her Consent and the

parties having submitted affidavits and memoranda in support of
their position and having argued the matter

-1-

before

the

Court

and

submitting

to

the

Court

memoranda and affidavits and
Petitioner's

protective

for

in

addition,

Motion

for

alternative amendment from judgment
on

for

decision

or

based

having

New
relief

upon the
considered

Trial

or in the

from

judgment

which

came

hearing before the Court on September 23,

1987.

The natural mother was again present and represented

by

her attorney, Richard B. Johnson. The adoptive parents were not
present

but

Dolowitz.

were

represented

by

their

attorney,

The Court, having carefully examined the

affidavits

and

arguments

presented

David S.
memoranda,

by counsel and the Court

being fully advised in the premises, now makes and

enters

the

following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

Court

finds that

is in fact

the natural mother of a minor child born out of wedlock on June
23, 1987.
2. The Court finds that on June 24, 1987, that the natural
mother,

appeared before Judge Michael

Murphy and was questioned concerning the Consent.

-2-

R.

3* The Court finds that the natural mother was not clearly
apprised of the finality of signing the Consent.

Specifically,

the Court finds that the natural mother was confused and indeed
believed
still

that

have

Adoption,

even

six

though

months,

would

not

she signed the Consent, she would

during

which

time

the

Decree

of

be final and at any time during that six

month period she could withdraw her Consent.
4.

The Court

knowingly

finds

consent

that

the

natural

mother

did

not

to the release of her parental rights on an

unconditional basis.
5. The Court finds that the natural mother did not consult
with members of her immediate family including her
until

after

consultation

the

birth

received

by

of
the

the

child

natural

own

and

mother

that the only
was

counselpr at .the UJbah Women's Health Center .^wc,^/u
'

6.

The

Court /finds

txiat

after

wanted

her

child

from

a

, A T ^ ^ ^ £ £UV*

the natural mother had

consulted with her own mother that the natural
she

mother

mother

decided

back and within three days advised the

counselor that she wished to withdraw her Consent.

-3-

7. The Court finds that a Petition to withdraw the natural
mother's Consent was filed as soon as practical in view of
financial

condition

which

her

was accomplished within 30 days of

the date she had given consent.
8. This Court finds in response to Petitioner's Protective
Motion for New Trial
Judgment

or

in

the

alternative

Amendment

from

or Relief from Judgment that this Court discussed the

matter of whether the case should be heard by Judge Murphy
originally

took

the

Consent

who

of the natural mother and finds

that neither party expressed a desire to have Judge Murphy hear
the matter.
9.

The Court finds that since neither party expressed the

desire to have Judge Murphy preside that

said

parties

waived

that right.
10.

The

Court

finds

that the Protective Motion for New

Trial or in the alternative Amendment from Judgment
from

Judgment

was

submitted

Relief

on affidavits and oral argument

without any request for the entry of
further

or

additional

evidence

and

finds that the parties waived their right to offer any

additional evidence by neglecting to make said request.

-4-

11.
an

The Court finds that the natural mother did not

informed

knowing

unconditional

release

of

make

her parental

rights and is entitled to revoke her Consent*
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court

now

makes

and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

Consent

to

adoption is hereby set aside and the

adoptive parents are ordered to return the minor child

to

the

natural mother forthwith.
2.

The

right

to have Judge Murphy who took the original

Consent preside over these proceedings has been waived

by

the

parties to this action.
3*

The

right

to

offer

these proceedings has been

additional evidence relative to

waived

by

the

parties

by

their

.mely assort
a s s e n t sai£
s a i d ^ i grfighy.
hV.
failure to timely
DATED t hlji s J S

day o f No^ejnberr 1 9 8 7 .

;HARD

Jiidge

rt^/MOTF^r
/
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ATTEiST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
3y 2±

2

Oeputv Clerk

MAILING CERTIFICATE
certify
that
on
the
3*4
day of
, 1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of
'the foreqoi
foregoing, postage prepaid, to:
hereby

Lincoln W. Hobbs
Dennis V. Haslam
Attorneys for Petitioner
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
P.O. Box 2668
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
CJSVUJ,

f\Qn K/f/,
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ADDENDUM"!"
ORDER OF STAY OF EXECUTION

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioners
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

FILED
SEP 2 51387

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

IN THE MATTER OF
THE ADOPTION OF:

)
)
)

ORDER OF STAY
OF EXECUTION

INFANT ANONYMOUS.

)

Civil No. A8 7-2 29

* * * * * * * *

This court, having considered the application of the
petitioners for a stay of execution of the Order of the Third
Judicial District Court directing return of Infant Anonymous to
the natural mother and the district court having refused to stay
said order pending presentation of the issues in this case on
appeal, this court now finds and concludes that a Stay of Execution should be entered by this court prohibiting enforcement of
the order of the District Court requiring return of Infant Anonymous to the child's natural mother until this matter is fully
considered by the court.
Accordingly IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
Execution of the Order implementing the decision of the
District

Court

of

September

1,

1987,

setting

aside

the

r e l i q u i s h m e n t of the natural mother and d i r e c t i n g
Infant

Anonymous

to

the natural

mother i s

hereby stayed

t h i s matter can be f u l l y considered by t h i s c o u r t .
DATED t h i s

J2<r day of c S ^ T S ^ / " /

1987.

Emrfri^iftfe Court Judge

Ap/W+7e
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the r e t u r n of
until

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to the
following on this «2.f>

day of September, 1987:

Mr. Richard B. Johnson
Attorney at Law
1327 South 800 East £300
Orem, Utah 84058

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
DSD:090487F

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that ont he 25th day of September, 1987, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Stay was mailed to each
of the following:
Honorable Richard H. Moffat
Third District Court
Salt Lake City, Utah
David S. Dolowitz, Esq.
PO Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Richard B. Johnson
Atttorney at Law
1327 South 800 East #300
Orem, Utah 84058

7?
t^C. Whitfield,
1
JUl/.a^C.
Ca
Management Cle

1

-3-

ADDENDUM "J"
ORDER REGARDING MODIFICATION OF FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER AND JUDGMENT

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
of and for
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Petitioners
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *

IN THE MATTER OF
THE ADOPTION OF:
INFANT ANONYMOUS

)

ORDER REGARDING

)

MODIFICATION OF

)
)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Civil No. A87-229
Judge Moffat

* * * * *

jj

The above-entitled matter came before the court, the

(Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, on Friday, the 5th day
i

IIof February, 1988, to consider the objections of the adoptive
[parents to the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
IIOrder and Judgment that had been accepted by the court and
|ientered on December 3, 1987.

Counsel for the natural mother

agreed that Rule 2. 9 of the Rules of Practice of the District
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah had not been followed

I in

this

matter

and

agreed

that

it

was

appropriate

for

I court to consider the objections of the adoptive parents.
court

then

heard

|| ruled

that

the

i| Judgment

and

considered

objection

to

should be sustained,

the

specific

Paragraph
and,

1

of

the
The

objections

and

the

and

Order

by interlineation,

deleted

j the language "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree
of

Adoption,"

and

inserted

the

language

"Order

of

Temporary

i

,' Custody filed and dated June 24, 1987,"
The

court

then

considered

the

objections

to

the

»• Findings of Fact and the court, examining the objection to the
| proposed Finding of Fact No. 3, determined that, although the
adoptive parents objected to proposed Findings of Fact No. 3
!j on the grounds that there had been no trial and this could not
ij
I be

determined

J affidavits,
jl Bagley,
Judge

as

a question

to-wit:

opposing
Michael

those

the

of

of

fact,

Dr.

affidavit

Murphy

had

there

Cynthia
of

made

the

a

A.

were

conflicting

Jones

natural

and

mother,

determination

Susan
and

directly

il

|| contrary to this determination,
the ruling of the court
! necessarily encompassed this finding and it was appropriate.

!

i!
ji The
!

objection

overruled

was

overruled.

the objections

On

the

same

basis,

of the adoptive parents

the
to

court

Findings

|| of Fact, Paragraph 4, Paragraph 6, Paragraph 7 and Paragraph
11.
The court determined that the objection should be granted
i

|| in part as to Paragraph

5 and by interlineation at the end of

the existing provision, the court added the language

"...

and the consultation set forth in the affidavit of Cynthia A.
Jones, M. D.

n

The objections of the adoptive parents to Paragraphs 8,
9 and 10 were withdrawn.
Having
'I1

i interlineation

thus

ruled

on

the

made the corrections

objections
that

the

and

court

by

deemed

appropriate to make, the court now ratifies, and by means of
this order, confirms its entry of the the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order and Judgment as thus modified,
as previously entered on December 3, 1987, to the extent that
the objections of the petitioners are inconsistent with this
ruling, they are overruled.
DATED this

day of February, 1988.

RICHARD H. MOFFAT
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS REFLECTING
THE RULING OF THE COURT:

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Petitioners

T^^^^r^* rf />RICHARD B. JOHNSOl
Attorney for Natural Mother

CERTIFICATE QF MAILINO
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true copy of the above and foregoing Order, this
day of

, 1988, to:
Mr. Richard B. Johnson
Attorney at Law
1327 South 800 East #300
Orem, Utah 84058

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ

-#-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

"Z<

day of / ^ t ^

1988, I mailed a* true and correct cop#?sof the foregoing to the
following, postage prepaid.
David S. Dolowitz
Julie A. Bryan
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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